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NOTES
HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEVERED THE INDIAN CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT FROM FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRECEDENT UNDER THE GUISE OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Morgan Medders*
I. Introduction
Two competing interests dominate the interplay between federal Indian
law and individual civil rights. On one hand, the U.S. government uplifts
tribal sovereignty and recognizes the importance of tribal self-governance,
and nowhere is this more special than setting the guidelines for tribal
membership. On the other hand, the individual liberties that the Bill of
Rights secures must be conferred to everyone. The most recent display of
this tension was demonstrated in Tavares v. Whitehouse.1 Attempting to
reconcile the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights while carefully
respecting tribal sovereignty, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act
(“ICRA”).2 Generally, the Act extends most, but not all, of the Bill of
Rights to Indian tribes, and thus requires that tribes provide these standards
to their citizens. Among the provisions, the ICRA carves out a small
pathway for habeas corpus relief, allowing tribal citizens to seek review in
federal court for confinement. 3
Quite often, unfortunately, claims under the ICRA generate tension
between tribal sovereignty and civil rights. After the ICRA’s enactment,
questions arose as to how federal courts would interpret the habeas
provision of the Act. This Note focuses on one of those questions. In 2017,
several plaintiffs raised the issue of whether their temporary exclusion from
tribal land constituted a detention for purposes of the ICRA. 4 Jessica
Tavares, along with three other plaintiffs, brought suit in federal court
under the ICRA against the Tribal Council of the United Auburn Indian
Community (“UAIC”) and sought habeas relief from the Tribe’s decision
*
1.
2.
3.
4.

Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012).
Id. § 1303; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Tavares, 851 F.3d at 867-69.
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to, among other things, temporarily exclude them from tribal land. 5 They
presented two arguments to the court: first, that the UAIC’s decision to
withhold per capita payments created a basis for habeas review; second, and
most importantly, that the UAIC’s decision to exclude petitioners from
tribal lands established federal jurisdiction. 6 The Eastern District of
California rejected these arguments and dismissed the claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the ICRA. 7 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed. 8 This Note examines how the Ninth Circuit resolved this
contention in the Tavares opinion.
Tavares is an important benchmark in the relationship between selfdetermination and federal civil rights legislation relating to tribes. While
this Note is an evaluation of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the petitioners
have filed for a writ of certiorari as of September 2017. The facts of this
case fall somewhere in between the groups of cases where federal courts
have found habeas jurisdiction adequate to evaluate a tribe’s confinement of
its own members and where courts have clearly deemed it inappropriate.
While the Tavares court could have allowed petitioners a chance to
vindicate their civil rights claim in federal court, it postulated this as
antithetical to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez9 in that doing so would open
the floodgates for tribal members seeking federal habeas review.
Contemplating big picture ramifications on tribal governance and tribes’
sovereignty to render binding judgments on tribal members, the court took a
heightened stance on the ICRA’s grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction
and improperly foreclosed habeas review in this instance. Here, the Ninth
Circuit proclaimed that the ICRA’s federal habeas relief provision calls for
a greater standard than the federal habeas corpus statute, and that relief
extends to only those circumstances amounting to true physical
confinement. While rationalizing that reversing an instance of temporary
exclusion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may provide justice for the
individual, the court deferred towards preservation of tribal autonomy to set
forth the specifications for membership.
Therefore, says the Ninth Circuit, in the interest of self-governance,
tribal members facing temporary exclusion cannot invoke federal habeas
jurisdiction because it is insufficient under the ICRA’s detention standard.
Tavares contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s previous decisions equating the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 878.
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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ICRA with the federal custody standard and improperly decided that
petitioners did not suffer a severe restraint on liberty.
II. Law Before the Case
Prior to the enactment of the ICRA, tribes operated on their own sense of
fundamental rights, which many tribes supplemented through adoption of
various pieces of the Bill of Rights. 10 The first landmark Supreme Court
case involving the relationship between Indian tribes and the Bill of Rights
was Talton v. Mayes.11 Talton involved the murder of two members of the
Cherokee tribe on Cherokee land.12 The defendant argued that his
indictment by a small grand jury was unconstitutional and invoked the Fifth
Amendment as his defense. 13 Rejecting the defendant’s federal habeas
petition and the right of the defendant to avail himself under the Fifth
Amendment, the Court proclaimed broadly that the United States
Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes. 14
The reaction to Talton was significant. Members of the United States
government were shocked by the notion that Indian Country did not fall
under the ambit of the Constitution. Over time, Congress developed an
interest in uniformly binding tribes and their members to the same
constitutional principles binding the federal government.15 In 1968,
Congress solidified this interest with the passage of ICRA. The Act extends
most of the Bill of Rights to tribes, as well as the principles of equal
protection and due process.16 While the text of these provisions was the
same as those in the U.S. Constitution, the ICRA did not extend the
underlying precedents along with them. Therefore, Indian tribes have
largely been free to interpret the ICRA’s Bill of Rights in their own way.
As a result, traditional tribal notions of justice embedded themselves into
interpretations of the ICRA.
Further, while Congress did not want to encroach on tribal selfgovernance, it still provided a narrow means of redress for judgments
through habeas corpus relief. 17 With respect to habeas jurisdiction, the Act
10. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.04, at 979-80 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN].
11. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
12. Id. at 379.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 382-83.
15. COHEN, supra note 10, § 14.04, at 980-81.
16. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
17. Id. § 1303.
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provides that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available
to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe.” 18 This provision of the ICRA is
significant in later jurisprudence.
A. Background of ICRA’s Interpretation
The ICRA was enacted in 1968 at the end of the Termination Era.19 The
Act was, in large part, a response to the salience of Congress’s interest in
overseeing some aspects of tribal criminal procedure. 20 Namely, Congress
sought to respond to tribal exemptions from federal constitutional
restraints.21 Horror stories arose about gross injustice taking place in Indian
Country. 22 The fear, although largely pretextual, was that tribal
governments were enforcing judgments against their members in ways not
constitutionally permissible in state or federal courts. Ironically, while
Congress was concerned about Indian tribes committing civil rights
violations against their members, state and local governments committing
violations posed the greater danger. Several tribal members testified before
Congress as to this notion.23
The ICRA is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303. Section 1301 contains
a definitional section, 24 which defines for purposes of the Act: “Indian
tribe,” “powers of self-government,” “Indian court,” and “Indian.” Section
1302 is where the Act incorporates piecemeal provisions of the Bill of
Rights through which Congress sought to limit the actions of tribal
governments.25 In particular, this section incorporates all of the First
Amendment without the Establishment Clause, 26 the entire Fourth
Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth

18. Id.
19. For background on the Termination Era, see COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.06, at 84-93.
20. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (1969).
21. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 865 (2017).
22. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND M ATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 380 (6th
ed. 2011).
23. Id.
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
25. Id. § 1302.
26. The Establishment Clause was not included because tribes enjoy the right to
establish an official religion; notably, the Pueblo tribal structure is fundamentally Catholic.
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Amendment,27 and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the ICRA imposes a sentencing cap that
prohibits Indian tribes from imposing prison sentences greater than oneyear and also includes respective fine limits. 28 Congress’s rationale behind
instituting this cap was to keep tribal courts fixed as misdemeanor courts
and allow the federal government to handle the more expensive
prosecutions.
Finally, § 1303 establishes federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. It states:
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person,
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order
of an Indian tribe.”29 Habeas relief for tribal members is certainly not a
novel concept.30 After the ICRA’s enactment, it was not long before
plaintiffs began seeking relief under the statute. The question, however, was
what type of relief the ICRA provided.
This question was addressed in perhaps the most significant Indian civil
rights case: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.31 In Santa Clara Pueblo,
petitioners brought a claim under the ICRA questioning the Santa Clara
Pueblo’s membership ordinance that denied membership to the descendants
of female members who married outside of the Tribe. 32 The petitioners
brought their claim under 25 U.S.C. § 1302, but the Supreme Court notably
concluded that while normally federal statutes authorize a private right of
action, such a right does not exist in regard to the ICRA. 33 Put another way,
Congress did not manifest a clear intent to create a civil right of action
under the ICRA. 34 Instead, the Court’s only mechanism for review under
the ICRA exists in § 1303.35 Even criminal review is limited to only habeas
corpus.36
27. Some components of the Sixth Amendment were not implemented because they
would pose financial burdens on tribes. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64
(1978).
28. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B)-(D) with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8). This
sentencing cap is the reason why the Act omits “life” in its Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
30. See generally United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D.
Neb. 1879).
31. 436 U.S. 49.
32. Id. at 52-53.
33. Id. at 72.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 67.
36. Id.
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In summary, the Court rationalized that a private right of action does not
exist under § 1302’s Bill of Rights incorporations because the § 1303
habeas provision exists. Otherwise, Congress would not have placed the §
1303 provision in the ICRA. Finally, the Santa Clara Pueblo Court
acknowledged that even though a § 1302 private right of action does not
exist for tribal members, the federal government can bring a claim against a
tribe under § 1302 to enforce provisions of the Bill of Rights against the
tribes.37 Unfortunately, this scenario has never occurred and is likely to
never happen.
The ICRA’s nearly identical language to the Bill of Rights does not
necessarily mean that tribal incorporations mirror federal precedent. Indeed,
tribes formulate their own standards of Due Process and Equal Protection. 38
The bottom line in Santa Clara Pueblo is that by not allowing a private
right of action, the federal government gives great deference to the
“tribalized” interpretations of the Bill of Rights. Though the ICRA is
chronologically a Termination Era piece of legislation, the Court’s decision
in Santa Clara Pueblo clarifies its status as a self-determination mechanism
for deference. Ultimately, because habeas jurisdiction is the only
mechanism for tribal citizens to have their rights vindicated under the
ICRA, plaintiffs began arguing for broader definitions of detention in order
to squeeze their claims into federal court.
B. What Constitutes a Detention for Habeas Purposes
Limited to the narrow § 1303 mechanism, the issue for plaintiffs became
determining what constitutes a detention under the ICRA. Various federal
circuit courts attempted to answer that question. First, the Second Circuit in
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians determined where federal
review of tribal convictions is undoubtedly appropriate as an outer limit. 39
In Poodry, the Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians permanently banished
petitioners from tribal lands and stripped them of citizenship. 40 Petitioners
brought a claim under the ICRA and argued that their permanent
banishment from tribal lands qualified as a detention meriting habeas
corpus review. 41 The court ultimately agreed and found that permanent
banishment is a “severe restraint on liberty,” not “civil in nature.”42 Also
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 72.
COHEN, supra note 10, § 14.03, at 943-44.
85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id. at 901, 888.
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notable in Poodry is that petitioners lacked a tribal mechanism to appeal the
judgment. 43
While permanent banishment is sufficiently serious, other tribal actions
have not risen to the level of deserving federal jurisdiction. In Shenandoah
v. Halbritter, members of the Oneida Nation brought suit against the
Nation’s representative under the ICRA in response to the Tribe’s housing
ordinance. 44 The ordinance provided that the Tribe could inspect and
eventually demolish homes noncompliant with building code standards. 45
Petitioners asserted that the representative was wielding this statute for
harassment and intimidation and that this practice justified habeas corpus
relief under the ICRA.46 The Second Circuit disagreed. 47 Deciding that the
ordinance was not sufficiently severe, the court reasoned that the statute and
its effects were economic in nature and, “[a]s a general rule, federal habeas
jurisdiction does not operate to remedy economic restraints.”48
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Second Circuit’s rationale that
permanent banishment constitutes sufficient unlawful detention for
purposes of the ICRA. Jeffredo v. Macarro involved disenrolled members
of the Pechanga Tribe suing for relief. 49 The petitioners invoked Poodry
and claimed that disenrollment was enough for habeas relief.50 Notably, the
disenrollment in this case did not bring banishment with it. The court found
this distinction critical, stating that “the potential threat of future eviction is
not sufficient to satisfy the detention requirement of § 1303.”51 Further,
disenrollment alone was not enough under the statute: “The detention
requirement is designed to limit the availability of habeas review to cases of
special urgency.”52 The most substantial takeaway from the case, however,
was the Jeffredo court’s statement that the “detention” requirement in the
ICRA is the same as the federal custody standard. 53
Santa Clara Pueblo also contemplated the policy rationales behind the
ICRA’s § 1303 habeas provision as the only pathway for a tribal member to

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 876.
366 F.3d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 91.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 92.
Id.
599 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 923 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 922.
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vindicate a civil rights claim against the tribe in federal court. 54 The Court
noted that Congress had a desire “not to intrude needlessly on tribal selfgovernment” and in doing so only provided the habeas pathway to serve the
dual statutory objectives of promoting the rights of individual tribal
members and furthering Indian self-government.55 The principles
expounded in Santa Clara Pueblo remain significant: in order for Indian
tribes to retain sovereignty, they should remain largely free from the
intrusive effects of judicial review and any such review should be carefully
limited.56
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Petitioners Jessica Tavares, Donna Caesar, Barbara Suehead, and Dolly
Suehead are four members of the United Auburn Indian Community
(UAIC), a federally recognized Indian tribe. 57 The UAIC is located in the
Sierra Nevada foothills of Auburn, California, and is comprised of two
tribes: the Miwok and Maidu Indians. 58 It is a small community composed
of roughly 170 members.59 The governing body of the community is a fivemember Tribal Council.60 Interactions between the Tribal Council and the
petitioners gave rise to the action.
The named plaintiff was a well-respected member of the UAIC.61 The
trial court noted that she formally served as a Tribal Council chair,
informally referred to as “chief,” and that the community held her opinions
in high esteem. 62 The situation escalated for the petitioners when they
decided to speak out against the Tribal Council’s decisions; among other
things, petitioners made allegations that the Tribal Council mismanaged its
54. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978).
55. Id. at 71; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
56. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67.
57. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2017).
58. About Us, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY, https://www.auburnrancheria.com/
about (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
59. About Us: The Restoration Act, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY, https://www.
auburnrancheria.com/about/copy_of_the-land-trust (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
60. About Us: Tribal Council, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY, https://www.
auburnrancheria.com/about/tribal-council (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
61. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 878 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Tavares v. Whitehouse, No. 2:13-CV-02101-TLN-CKD, 2014 WL 1155798, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir.
2017).
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finances and was dishonest in conducting elections. 63 They gained
substantial traction and eventually had these claims published in “non-tribal
news outlets.”64
Petitioners began a recall campaign. 65 Under the procedures for recall,
they needed to acquire signatures from forty percent of the UAIC. 66
Petitioners maintained that they did, in fact, meet this requirement, but the
Community disputed this.67 Conveniently enough, the Tribal Council is also
in charge of the Elections Committee that oversees this entire process. 68
The Tribal Council did not take well to the recall campaign and promptly
notified the petitioners that they would be subject to disciplinary action and
a potential withholding of per capita payments. 69 The notices issued by the
Council stated that the petitioners acted maliciously to slander and commit
libel against the Tribe, and that the petitioners’ conduct of undermining the
Council was harmful to tribal programs and business. 70 The Council stated
that petitioners acted in violation of tribal law. 71
Also included in the written notices was the result of the Tribal Council’s
determination of how it chose to respond to petitioners’ conduct. The
Council voted to issue two separate orders: (1) an order to withhold the
petitioners’ per capita payments, and (2) an order to exclude petitioners
from tribal lands and facilities. 72 Petitioners were barred from all tribal
events and could not attend tribal meetings. 73 They could, however, vote by
absentee ballot.74 The duration of each order varied between Tavares and
the other petitioners: the exclusion order was for a period of ten years for
Tavares and two years for the other three petitioners, while the per capita
withholdings were for a period of four years for Tavares and six months for
the other petitioners.75

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Tavares, 851 F.3d at 867.
Id.
Tavares, 2014 WL 1155798, at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 868.
Id.
Tavares, 2014 WL 1155798, at *4.
Tavares, 851 F.3d at 868.
Id.
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The UAIC provided a narrow pathway for petitioners to appeal the
Council’s punishment, but only for the per capita withholdings. 76 This was
also facilitated through the Council itself. 77 No mechanism existed for the
petitioners to appeal the exclusion order. 78 As a result of the appeal process,
the UAIC reduced the withholdings by six months for Tavares and one
month for the other petitioners.79
The petitioners then brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the
Eastern District of California, claiming they were denied due process and
punished in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. 80 The
trial court found that the restraint was severe but did not constitute
“detention” under the ICRA. 81 The case was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 82 Petitioners appealed to the Ninth Circuit.83
B. Decision
The Analysis portion of the opinion begins by referencing two bedrock
principles in Indian law: “tribal sovereignty and congressional primacy in
Indian affairs.”84 With respect to tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes generally
retain the sovereignty that existed prior to the genesis of the United States. 85
Tribal sovereignty was full and uncompromised until European nations
discovered America.86 After Indian tribes were limited to an occupancy
right over land, the Court placed further jurisdictional limitations on the
tribes.87 The remaining aspects of sovereignty today, while not complete,
76. Tavares, 2014 WL 1155798, at *5.
77. Id. The Petitioners note this to be a due process concern.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *10.
82. Id. at *12.
83. See Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2017).
84. Id. at 869.
85. See id.
86. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that upon
discovery of the new world, the discovering European sovereign gets ownership of the
underlying fee title to the discovered lands and the exclusive right to purchase the occupancy
right of indigenous people). These are known respectively as the vesting of fee title and
restraint on alienation clauses. In addition, the ownership of the underlying fee title extended
to the United States after the Revolutionary War.
87. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding
that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act as
constitutional).
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still protect the principle that tribes, as sovereigns, ought to govern
themselves.
The United States Supreme Court pronounced the critical, and often
contradicting, caveat that self-governance cannot be inconsistent with the
guardian-ward relationship. 88 Inherent sovereignty is reduced by
congressional primacy in Indian affairs, otherwise known as Congress’s
plenary power.89 The relationship between these two principles is
essentially that “[t]ribal sovereignty offers a backdrop against which the
applicable federal statutes must be read.” 90 Because Congress enjoys such
broad authority over tribal matters, federal courts hesitate to interpret any
statute against tribal sovereignty unless Congress expresses clear intent to
establish a limitation.91
The first issue the Tavares court addressed was whether the UAIC’s
withholding of petitioners’ per capita payments created federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. 92 The court quickly answered in the negative. 93 Per
capita payments are “‘the distribution of money or other thing[s] of value to
all members of the tribe, or to identified groups of members, which [are]
paid directly from the net revenues of any tribal gaming activity.’” 94 The
court invoked two authorities to support its reasoning of why habeas
jurisdiction was inappropriate for this issue. First, the court recognized the
Second Circuit case, Shenandoah, as persuasive authority that economic
penalties do not warrant federal habeas jurisdiction. 95 Second, the court
invoked a federal regulation that designates per capita disputes to tribal
courts.96 Indeed, the court’s brevity on this issue makes it clear that
withholding per capita payments is entirely within the UAIC’s sovereign
authority and is insufficient to justify federal court review. The petitioner
88. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (noting that the tribes’
relationship with the United States resembles that of a ward to a guardian). This idea did not
acquire legal force until Kagama.
89. See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
90. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 869 (quoting McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411
U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted)).
91. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
92. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 870.
93. Id.
94. What Are Per Capita Payments?, MVSKOKE MEDIA (Jan. 27, 2017), https://
mvskokemedia.com/what-are-per-capita-payments/.
95. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 870.
96. Id. “You must utilize or establish a tribal court system, forum or administrative
process for resolving disputes arising from the allocation of net gaming revenue and the
distribution of per capita payments.” 25 C.F.R. § 290.23 (2000).
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even acknowledged in oral argument that the case could not have been
brought to federal court based on an economic benefit alone. 97
After addressing per capita payments, the court then considered the
claims brought by petitioners Donna Caesar, Dolly Suehead, and Barbara
Suehead separately from Tavares. Here, the Ninth Circuit found the
doctrine of mootness barred their appeals because there was no longer a live
controversy. 98 The dissent agreed, but the petitioners disputed this in oral
argument by claiming the orders have collateral consequences in the form
of the stigma created by the Tribe referencing the orders in tribal
publications.99
Next, the court addressed whether temporary exclusion orders are
sufficiently serious for habeas jurisdiction. This is the key issue of the
opinion. Normally, the requisite standard for determining habeas
jurisdiction is when a person is “in custody,” 100 but the ICRA uniquely uses
“detention” instead. 101 The court deemed this distinction to be a significant
one because “detention” carries a meaning of stronger physical control. 102
Even more, the court referenced that members of Congress equated
“detention” to imprisonment. 103 This difference, critical to the Ninth
Circuit, was enough to find that the ICRA calls for true, physical
confinement, as opposed to the more open-ended “custody” standard of the
federal habeas statute.
With this initial understanding of “detention” under the ICRA, the court
looked further to case law found in Poodry, Shenandoah, and Jeffredo. The
Second Circuit in Poodry legitimized the ICRA habeas issue by being the
first case where a federal circuit court found a tribal decision to be
punishment outside of physical confinement—namely, permanent exclusion

97. Oral Argument at 28:23, Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
14-15814), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000015567.
98. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 878.
99. Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 27:30.
100. Typically, the federal statute governing habeas relief is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which
provides:
[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
101. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 871.
102. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
103. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 873.
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from tribal land—sufficient for habeas jurisdiction. 104 Poodry received
substantial attention. In particular, it left open the question of what other
penalties might receive habeas jurisdiction under the ICRA. Two years
later, Shenandoah attempted to foreclose this question by limiting Poodry
only to permanent banishment.105 The Ninth Circuit took issue with the
Second Circuit’s reluctance to distinguish disenrollment and banishment.
Unlike the persuasive effects of Poodry and Shenandoah, Jeffredo
presented precedent that the Tavares court implemented in its analysis: that
federal habeas jurisdiction does not cover tribal membership disputes. 106
Relying strongly on Jeffredo and other authority, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that tribal sovereignty extends to decisions to exclude individual
members from lands and facilities. 107 The tribes alone should make
decisions on membership and intrusion, with federal court review only
undermining this inherent tribal function. According to the Tavares court,
habeas relief is a difficult threshold to pass in this instance. 108 Temporary
exclusion is not as severe as the permanent banishment situation in Poodry
and is therefore inadequate for habeas corpus. As a final point, the court
noted that it does not look to diminish petitioners’ situation or the
seriousness of the allegations against the respondent, but ultimately,
petitioners can only seek redress in tribal courts.109
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for “[recalibrating] the
balance” between tribal sovereignty and individual civil rights. 110 The
dissent states that ICRA “detention” should be interpreted the same as
federal “custody” based on Jeffredo.111The dissent impresses that the
individual interests at stake in the petitioners’ claims are critical.

104. Id. at 874.
105. Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 92 (2nd Cir. 2004).
106. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 875.
107. The last citation in the Tavares opinion invokes Fisher v. District Court, stating,
“[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum
to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because
it is intended to benefit [his or her] class,” and further self-determination. Tavares, 851 F.3d
at 878 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91
(1976)).
108. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 876.
109. Id. at 878 (“[T]he petitioners’ remedy is with the Tribe, not in the federal courts.”).
In other words, the fact that the tribe does not provide as robust of an appeal system for the
petitioners to avail themselves is not of federal concern.
110. Id. at 880.
111. Id.
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IV. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit in Tavares excessively weighed the interests of the
tribes in creating their own standards for membership against the interests
of tribal members in having their rights vindicated in federal court. In this
balancing act, Tavares unfortunately fell far against the individual’s right to
habeas relief, leaving far-reaching implications in its wake for the
individual civil rights of tribal citizens. Federal circuit courts, particularly
the Second and Ninth Circuits, have given much credence to the word
choice of “detention,” as opposed to “custody,” in the ICRA. This is
contrary to how habeas relief is traditionally utilized in American law and
how 25 U.S.C. § 1303 should work.
Fundamentally, the ICRA detention standard should be interpreted the
same as federal custody. 112 The Ninth Circuit recognized this notion in
Jeffredo but later ignored it in Tavares.113 Jeffredo realized that the standard
for ICRA detention should be consistent with federal case law on what
constitutes a severe restraint on liberty. 114 The dissenting judge
acknowledged this principle in oral argument. 115 Despite this longstanding
principle, Tavares was decided on the idea that the “detention” needed to be
permanent, like the situation in Poodry, despite this being antithetical to
federal case law.
In the petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner’s question presented
asks: “Should the ‘detention’ requirement for habeas review under the
ICRA be construed ‘more narrowly than’ the ‘custody’ showing required
under other federal habeas statutes?” 116 The Ninth Circuit should have
answered “no” when addressing this question. Undoubtedly, the UAIC as a
tribe should do all it can to exercise tribal sovereignty and determine
membership. The Supreme Court has reinforced this as fundamental. 117
However, it goes too far to say that tribes can strip tribal members of their
membership, either temporarily or permanently, 118 potentially without due
process. Tavares foreclosed this scenario from reaching federal court by
limiting a tribal member’s right to be heard until the punishment amounts to
112. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 9.09, at 780.
113. Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010).
114. Id.
115. Compare Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 17:30, with Tavares, 851 F.3d at 871.
116. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tavares, 851 F.3d 863 (No. 14-15814), 2017 WL
4251148.
117. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54 (1978).
118. Tavares provides an example of a temporary repeal of tribal membership, while
Poodry provides an example of a permanent repeal of tribal membership.
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physical detention. Santa Clara Pueblo is distinguishable here, as the Court
did not contemplate facts that involved tribal members being stripped of
their very identity; instead, the facts were limited to specifications for
membership.119
Federal habeas corpus’s “severe restraint on liberty” standard is not as
strict as the standard proffered by the Ninth Circuit here. Indeed, federal
courts allow habeas relief in several areas outside of contemporaneous
physical detention. Examples of this include habeas where an individual is
out on parole,120 or even where an individual is on probation. 121
More importantly, the petitioners here not only enjoy citizenship in the
UAIC,122 an Indian tribe with foundations reaching past the birth of the
United States, but they also enjoy citizenship in the United States. The very
idea that tribal members retain both forms of citizenship is a key reason
Congress enacted the ICRA. Just because the petitioners’ claim involves a
tribal council decision does not mean they should be deprived of their right
to federal habeas review. To the contrary, petitioners’ rights as Americans
should predominate in this instance because their means of redress are
narrowly limited, if available at all, to relief in federal court.
Another reason federal habeas review was appropriate in Tavares is
because it is permissive in other legal spheres. Non-Indians have used this
device against state punishments frequently throughout history. 123 In fact,
habeas corpus relief has been granted in non-Indian contexts in nonpermanent circumstances. 124 Because the right exists for non-Indians
against enforcement of state laws, it is faulty to not also apply this to tribal
members. In short, the “sufficiently serious” standard is interpreted more
stringently when the petitioners are tribal members, even though American
citizens should enjoy the same habeas rights irrespective of the jurisdiction
where the detention takes place. In summary, the standard for habeas
review against state government detentions should be the same for tribal

119. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51.
120. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
121. See United States ex rel. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1970).
122. It is important to note that the enjoyment of membership occurred with the
exception of the exclusion order discussed in this case.
123. See J AMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 293-305 (3rd ed.
2017) (chapter 8).
124. Id. at 307.
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governments. This would allow tribal citizens access to the federal criminal
justice system they are entitled to enjoy as American citizens. 125
There should, no doubt, be a requirement to exhaust tribal court remedies
to protect tribal sovereignty. Litigants should not be able to circumvent
procedure where relief could perhaps be granted within the same tribe, but
through a higher appellate process. Through this guideline, selfdetermination becomes more adequately protected from the risks
contemplated in Santa Clara Pueblo.
Indeed, in cases where modes of appeal exist under a particular tribe’s
jurisdiction, litigants should always explore those before seeking redress
through habeas corpus. Here, petitioners did not have any further avenues
for appeal or mechanisms of tribal review in the UAIC’s governmental
structure. The Tavares court perhaps would have required exhaustion if
UAIC methods of review did exist.126 This would have correctly advanced
the aims of Santa Clara Pueblo that federal courts need not be
overburdened by habeas petitions inconsistent with self-determination. But,
the fact that petitioners did not have any way of appealing the exclusion
orders speaks directly to a lack of due process. This concern is heightened
by the fact that the Tribal Council passing the punishment in Tavares was
the same body against whom petitioners were speaking out. When tribal
members are punished by tribes that lack a robust system of appeal, such as
the situation in Tavares, tribal members should be able to avail themselves
to the ICRA’s 25 U.S.C. § 1303 habeas corpus provision for federal review.
It is hard to reconcile the notion that ICRA relief should only result out
of criminal prosecutions with the simple truth that many tribes, like the
UAIC, do not have a criminal code or a criminal court.127 The UAIC
punishment here is designated as civil in nature because the UAIC does not
have a criminal code. The ICRA calls only for detention and is silent on a
requirement for criminal prosecution. 128 Furthermore, a potential criminal
requirement would allow tribes to circumvent the possibility of federal
habeas corpus by simply not creating criminal courts. In this scenario, tribal

125. See Brief of Andrea M. Seielstad, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-15814), 2017 WL 4857396.
126. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 873 (invoking ICRA legislative history memorandum by then
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford discussing exhaustion requirement in state
imprisonment contexts).
127. Id. at 874 n.12. The Tavares court declines to decide whether ICRA requires a
criminal judgment, but the lack of a criminal prosecution does weigh heavy on the case.
128. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
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governments could hypothetically impose any sentence on an individual
member with federal habeas relief entirely foreclosed.
The Ninth Circuit focused heavily on the duration of punishment to
determine that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under the ICRA;
specifically, that the Tavares temporary ban from lands and facilities does
not equate to permanent banishment. In other words, if it is not permanent,
then it is not severe. Yet the petitioners, like so many tribal citizens, place
their entire cultural, personal, and professional identity in their tribe. To
attach a requirement of permanence to exclusion is inconsistent with the
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence standard of severity that should have
been applied. 129 While the Ninth Circuit claimed it did not seek to minimize
petitioners’ situation, it perhaps did so by misunderstanding the significance
that tribal members place in accessing tribal facilities and participating in
the governmental process.130 Any sentence, regardless of duration, that
deprives tribal members of their natural right to be members of a tribe
should always be questionable and investigated through habeas relief.
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly decided that federal subject matter
jurisdiction under the ICRA was lacking in this case. The ICRA’s
“detention” requirement should be interpreted the same as the “custody”
requirement in federal habeas corpus precedent. Holding that a severe
restraint on liberty does not exist in Tavares will allow further civil rights
abuses levied by tribes against individual members and will deprive tribal
members of appropriate federal habeas corpus relief.

129. Habeas does not require permanent sentences. See PFANDER, supra note 123, at 293307.
130. See Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 26:27; see also id. at 25:40 (counsel for
petitioner inquiring as to how exclusion order is any different from a private individual
saying “we don’t want you at our party”).
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